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prove the injured party's chances of receiving compensation. Had the
court refused to grant State Farm indemnity, plaintiffs would still have
been able to collect from the vicariously liable owner. The decision
does serve to benefit the unauthorized permittee tort-feasor and his in-
surer. It frees him and his insurer from the cost of his negligence, and
puts the cost on the rental agency and ultimately the public. The re-
sult is an extension of Susco that is unnecessary to carry out the initial
purpose of financial responsibility legislation-compensating injured
victims and making highway travel more safe.
Torts-IMPAcT RULE-DAMAGES ARE RECOVERABLE FOR PHYSICAL CON-
SEQUENCES OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS REGARDLESS OF WHETHER INJURED
PARTY SUFFERED PHYSICAL IMPACT IN THE COMMISSION OF THE TORT.-
Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972) rev'd,
No. 43,363 (Fla., Jan. 10, 1974).
Two cars driven by the defendants collided. The car driven by
defendant Bradley then struck the Stewart home, and the defendant
Gilliam's car struck a tree in the Stewart yard. Mrs. Stewart, who was in
her house when the Bradley car struck it, ran outside to see if anyone
was hurt. Soon after returning to the house, she felt chest pains. Two
hours later she was placed in the intensive care unit of a nearby hos-
37. The court contended that its ruling would in the long run make recovery easier
for injured third parties:
Often such permittees of rental car lessees temporarily driving rental cars would not
be as fortunate as Roth and have the protection of their own personal auto liability
insurance coverage, rendering it even more difficult for injured members of the
public to recover their losses arising from the negligence of drivers of rental cars.
269 So. 2d at 7.
This reasoning fails because the fact that a permittee tort-feasor might "not be as for-
tunate as Roth and have the protection of . . . liability insurance coverage" is irrelevant
in terms of protecting the public. Protection of injured members of the public requires
only that some source of recovery be made available; Florida law has provided that that
source will be the vicariously liable owner. Once that primary source of recovery has been
supplied, different concerns should govern determination of which insurance company
shall ultimately bear the cost. This was recognized by Justice Dekle in his dissenting
opinion:
Of course there is liability [on the part of the lessor] to the injured party and no
rental contract agreement can prevent it. With that there is complete accord. Here,
however, that question has been settled and the respective insurance companies are
litigating indemnification. ...
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pital. Four weeks after that she died. Death was caused by complica-
tions resulting from a myocardial infarction.'
As administrator of his wife's estate, Mr. Stewart sued Bradley and
Gilliam. A physician testified that the infarction resulted from the
fright that Mrs. Stewart suffered upon hearing the sound of the acci-
dent. Recognizing that Florida law precluded recovery for injuries pro-
duced by unintentional torts absent physical impact with the plaintiff,-
the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. Abandoning the established
rule in Florida, the court discarded impact with the plaintiff as a nec-
essary element in actions seeking to recover for physical injuries result-
ing from negligently inflicted emotional distress.
First formulated by the English courts in the late nineteenth cen-
tury,3 the so-called "impact rule" arose from a reluctance to recognize
1. Myocardial infarctions are commonly referred to as "coronaries" or as "heart
attacks." A more technical explanation of the term follows:
The effect of local anemia on tissues varies with the degree of deprivation of blood
to which the tissue is subjected. When no blood can reach the tissue, because of
the complete obstruction of the supplying blood-vessel, the tissue dies and is said
to be infarcted. The process is called infarction. This complete anemia of tissue is
usually due to a plugging of the blood vessel by a blood clot, a bubble of air, or a
globule of fat.
When a portion of the heart is thus deprived of blood, an infarct of the myo-
cardium results.
If the infarct is extensive or includes a vital part, death ensues. If less extensive,
healing may take place, a scar forms, and the patient recovers.
Brahdy & Kahn, Clinical Approach to Alleged Traumatic Disease, 23 BOSTON U.L. REV.
238, 244 n.27 (1943). Mrs. Stewart also later suffered a cerebral embolus-a blood clot
in the brain not originating in the brain-that caused partial paralysis. See 271 So. 2d
at 468 & n.2.
2. See pp. 673-74 infra. The principal decision was presented to the supreme court on
certified question and was argued on April 5, 1973. Gilliam v. Stewart, No. 43,363 (Fla., filed
Feb. 8, 1973). It "travels with" Johnson v. Herlong Aviation, Inc., 271 So. 2d 226 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972), which is also before the supreme court on certified question.
Herlong Aviation was argued to the court on June 7, 1973. Herlong Aviation, Inc. v.
Johnson, No. 43,431 (Fla., filed Feb. 26, 1973). The two decisions were not consolidated for
review. The supreme court has handed down a decision in both cases. See note 42 infra.
3. The seminal decision was Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 A.C. 222
(P.C. 1888) (Can.). James and Mary Coultas were frightened when they drove over a
railroad crossing and were almost struck by an oncoming train. An employee of the de-
fendants had opened the gate to allow the plaintiffs to cross while the train was ap-
proaching. Mrs. Coultas, although never touched by the train, allegedly suffered from
"delicate health and impaired memory and eyesight" as a result of the incident. The
supreme court rejected contentions that the damages were too remote, since there had
been no impact and allowed the recovery. The Privy Council reversed and held that
impact must be shown before recovery would be allowed for such injuries. Their Lord-
ships were concerned with opening the courts to false claims:
[I]n every case where an accident caused by negligence had given a person a serious
nervous shock, there might be a claim for damages on account of mental injury.
1973]
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mental distress as a compensable injury. Absent impact, mental distress
was thought too ethereal to warrant legal redress.4 This reluctance later
expanded to deny recovery for physical injuries that resulted from men-
tal distress when there had been no impact.5 Physical injuries produced
by fright or shock were also viewed as too remote for the law to attrib-
ute liability to the tort-feasor.6 The lack of medical sophistication at
the time of the rule's creation may have afforded some basis for its early
acceptance. Physicians possessed only a rudimentary understanding of
the physiological nature of fright or shock and of its relationship to
apparently resulting physical injuries. 7 Requiring plaintiffs to sustain
direct physical injury as a condition precedent to recovery, it was
thought, would guarantee the validity of mental distress claims. All
these fears were eventually absorbed and confused in the contention
that permitting recovery without requiring a showing of impact would
throw open the judicial "floodgates" to frivolous claims." Despite the
repudiation of the rule by the English courts only thirteen years after
they had created it,9 the doctrine was quickly embraced in several
The difficulty which now often exists in case of alleged physical injuries of
determining whether they were caused by the negligent act would be greatly in-
creased, and a wide field opened for imaginary claims.
Id. at 225-26.
4. See International Ocean Tel. Co. v. Saunders, 14 So. 148, 154 (Fla. 1893). Speak-
ing of recovery for mental anguish, the court believed that "[i]t goes too much into the
realm of psychology, and there is no reliable way of ascertaining the injury to such an
intangible and spiritual thing as the mind." See also Herrick v. Evening Express Publish-
ing Co., 113 A. 16 (Me. 1921). See generally Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturb-
ance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep.
654, 863 (L.C. 1861) ("Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend
to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone .... ").
5. See Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 47 N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry,
45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896) ("Assuming that fright cannot form the basis of an action, it is
obvious that no recovery can be had for injuries resulting therefrom. . . . These results
merely show the degree of fright .... ").
6. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896); Ewing v. Pittsburg, C.C. &
St. L. Ry., 23 A. 340 (Pa. 1892); Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 A.C. 222
(P.C. 1888) (Can.).
7. Compare Bosley v. Andrews, 142 A.2d 263, 267 (Pa. 1958), with Niederman v.
Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84, 86 (Pa. 1970); cf. Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Dis-
ease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193 (1944).
8. See Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (Mass. 1897); Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896); Bosley v. Andrews, 142 A.2d 263, 267 (Pa. 1958); Huston v.
Borough of Freemansburg, 61 A. 1022, 1023 (Pa. 1905); Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coul-
tas, 13 A.C. 222, 226 (P.C. 1888) (Can.).
9. The rule announced in Victorian Railways was rejected in Dulieu v. White &
Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669. In Dulieu a pregnant woman suffered nervous shock when the
defendant's servant crashed his horse-drawn carriage into the tavern in which she was
working. As a result she became ill and gave birth prematurely. The court allowed re-
covery, although there was no impact, since physical injury resulted.
[Vol. I
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American jurisdictions.1o The problems created by rigid application
of the impact rule were also soon recognized, however, and a number
of the rule's early adopters eventually acknowledged that meritorious
claims were being refused because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate
the talismanic "impact." As a result, some jurisdictions abandoned the
rule1 while others evolved the sometimes ludicrous "slightest impact"
approach. The latter approach carried the courts to extremes in order
to find "impact" and thus permit recovery.' 2 Many jurisdictions simply
declined to adopt the rule.1"
In Florida the impact rule is supported by considerable decisional
precedent. As used to deny recovery for mental anguish without re-
sulting physical trauma, the rule dates to 1893.1 It was not expressly
10. See, e.g., West Chicago St. R.R. v. Liebig, 79 Ill. App. 567 (1898); Spade v. Lynn
& B.R.R., 47 N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896);
Miller v. Baltimore & O.S.W.R.R., 85 N.E. 499 (Ohio 1908).
11. Cf. Purcell v. Saint Paul City Ry., 50 N.W. 1034 (Minn. 1892).
12. See note 27 infra.
13. See, e.g., Kimberly v. Howland, 55 S.E. 778 (N.C. 1906); Simone v. Rhode Island
Co., 66 A. 202 (R.I. 1907).
14. The first use of the impact rule in Florida involved an action seeking recovery
for mental anguish without resulting physical trauma. In International Ocean Tel. Co.
v. Saunders, 14 So. 148 (Fla. 1893), the plaintiff's wife was in another city, 160 miles
away from the plaintiff, when she became critically ill. A telegram was sent through
the defendant to the plaintiff informing the latter of his wife's condition and requesting
that he either come to the hospital where she was being treated or communicate his
wishes by telegraph to the hospital. Although the telegram was properly transmitted
and arrived in the plaintiff's city two days before the death of his wife, the message was
not delivered to the plaintiff until nearly eleven hours after her death.
Alleging negligence, the plaintiff sought to recover from the telegraph company for
"great mortification, anguish, and pain of mind, and injury to his feelings." The court
rejected the claim for damages based upon mental anguish. In making its decision, the
court seemed largely concerned with the great difficulty that it perceived to be involved
in establishing and valuing mental anguish:
[V]erdicts awarding pecuniary compensation, strictly speaking, must be supported
by competent proofs. Can the extent or moneyed value of mental anguish be es-
tablished, even apprpoximately [sic], by any known method of legal proofs? . . .
Because of this, as it seems to us, insurmountable difficulty, we cannot agree with
the ... courts that have ... sustain[ed] pecuniary awards for mental suffering ....
... The resultant injury is one that soars so exclusively within the realms of
spirit land that it is beyond the reach of the courts to deal with, or to compensate
by any of the known standards of value.
Id. at 151-52.
The narrow holding of Ocean Telegraph, denying recovery for mental anguish aris-
ing from the breach of a telegraph company's contractual duty, was mitigated by statute
in 1913, and the law is still in force. FLA. STAT. § 363.06 (1971); see Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Taylor, 114 So. 529 (Fla. 1927).
The rule that there can be no recovery for mental anguish absent physical injury has
been periodically reaffirmed. See Dunahoo v. Bess, 200 So. 541 (Fla. 1941) (improper
embalming of the body of plaintiff's wife); Arcia v. Altagracia Corp., 264 So. 2d 865
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (child suffered shock and mental distress when part of
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invoked by the supreme court to deny recovery for tangible, physical
harm resulting from emotional distress, however, until 1954.15 In tort
actions damages for mental anguish are not recoverable, absent impact,
unless the tort is an intentional one of a malicious or wanton nature
or unless the harm resulted from malicious recklessness. 16 In actions
founded solely in contract, however, mental anguish is not a proper
element of damages even if the breach is malicious.1
7
Today the majority of American jurisdictions do not follow the
bathroom ceiling fell, missing her); Carter v. Lake Wales Hosp. Ass'n, 213 So. 2d 898
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (parents suffered mental pain and anguish because hospital
allowed baby to be taken from maternity ward by wrong parents); Levine v. Knowles,
197 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (plaintiff's dog died during routine treat-
ment by veterinarian; dog was subsequently cremated contrary to owner's directions);
Korbin v. Berlin, 177 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (six-year-old child exposed
to derogatory statements concerning her mother's sex habits); cf. Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45
So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950); Henry Morrison Flagler Museum v. Lee, 268 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
15. In Crane v. Loftin, 70 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1954), the plaintiff sought to recover for
personal injuries allegedly resulting from fright. There had been no physical impact;
plaintiff leaped from her car when she saw that it was about to be struck by a locomo-
tive. The court found no malice in the operation of the train and affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the action.
16. See Crane v. Loftin, 70 So. 2d 574, 575 (Fla. 1954); Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.
2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1950); Henry Morrison Flagler Museum v. Lee, 268 So. 2d 434, 436
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Kimple v. Riedel, 133 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1961).
17. The often quoted language of Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1950),
is not free from ambiguity on the question of recovery for mental anguish arising from a
breach of contract:
This court is committed to the rule, and we re-affirm it herein, that there can
be no recovery for mental pain and anguish unconnected with physical injury in
an action arising out of the negligent breach of a contract whereby simple negli-
gence is involved.
But we do not feel constrained to extend this rule to cases founded purely in
tort, where the wrongful act is such as to reasonably imply malice, or where, from
the entire want of care of attention to duty, or great indifference to the persons,
property, or rights of others, such malice will be imputed as would justify the
assessment of exemplary or punitive damages. The right to recover, in such
cases, is especially appropriate to tortious interference with rights . . . where men-
tal anguish . . . is not only the natural and probable consequence of the ...
wrong committed, but indeed is frequently the only injurious consequence to fol-
low from it. [Citations omitted.]
The extract does not make it clear whether a malicious breach of contract might create
a right founded in contract for which the aggrieved party could obtain compensation
for mental anguish. The rule is generally accepted, however, that recovery for mental
anguish is barred even in cases of malicious breach of contract. See Henry Morrison Flagler
Museum v. Lee, 268 So. 2d 434, 436-37 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972). The party aggrieved
by a contract breach may nevertheless obtain punitive damages if he can establish actions
attending the breach that constitute an independent, willful tort. See id. at 437; Carter
v. Lake Wales Hosp. Ass'n, 213 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968). See also Singleton
v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962, 971 (5th Cir. 1970); Carpel v. Saget Studios, Inc., 326 F. Supp.
1331 (E.D. Pa. 1971); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 341-42 (1932).
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impact rule. 8 They reject the artificiality of the contemporaneous im-
pact requirement and analyze actions for negligently inflicted mental
distress upon general tort principles. Only ten jurisdictions join Florida
as bastions of the impact rule.19
In addition to the clear weight of authority rejecting the impact
rule in other jurisdictions, two Florida district courts of appeal have
recently evinced contempt for its application.
In Way v. Tampa Coca Cola Bottling Co.,' 0 the plaintiff became
nauseated upon discovering what appeared to be a dead, hairless rat
in the bottled soft drink from which he was drinking. The Second
District Court of Appeal reversed a directed verdict for the defendant
bottler. Proceeding on the premise that the trial court had found a
lack of impact determinative, 2 1 the appellate court rejected application
of the impact rule in cases where adulterated food or drink results in
emotional trauma that, in turn, produces physical trauma. Within the
limited scope of its decision the court adopted a simple and traditional
proximate cause analysis.
Later, however, in Johnson v. Herlong Aviation, Inc.,22 the same
court appeared to abandon completely the impact rule by sustaining
a cause of action for mental pain and anguish that allegedly resulted
from the vibrations of a rented aircraft in which the plaintiff had
ridden.
Finally, in Stewart, the most recent Florida decision abandoning
the impact rule, the Fourth District Court of Appeal discarded the rule
insofar as it would preclude recovery when physical injury results from
emotional trauma. The Stewart opinion attempted to dispose of the
three arguments traditionally marshalled in support of the impact
rule. These arguments form a rather tortured logical chain: because
it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to prove causation between
mental distress and physical injuries, there will be many fraudulent
claims, and they will inundate the courts.
Arguably, the premise that there is nearly insurmountable difficulty
18. See Commentary, Torts: The Impact Rule-Nuisance or Necessity?, 25 U. FLA. L.
REv. 368, 375 (1973).
19. id.
20. 260 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
21. The court stated:
[T]he appellant was attempting to get the contents of the bottle out by sucking
upon it and discovered the foreign substance. He immediately became nauseated
and went outside and vomited. We might be correct in holding that this was suffi-
cient contact to get around the impact doctrine .... We choose rather to take
the position that the trial court based its directed verdict on the lack of impact.
Id. at 289.
22. 271 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972). . •
Florida State University Law Review [Vol. 1
in establishing a causal link between mental distress and an allegedly
resulting physical injury was supported by the state of medical knowl-
edge at the time of the rule's genesis. It finds little, if any, foundation,
however, in the current state of medical science.23 Stewart took notice
of the fact that "medical science has come a long way since the turn
of the century. ' '2 4 Then, adopting the view recently espoused by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Niederman v. Brodsky,2 5 the Florida
court concluded that this argument could no longer support the impact
rule, reflecting, as it does, a condescending and inaccurate view of mod-
em medicine.
26
Probably the clearest illustrations of the fallaciousness of the impact
rule are found in the "slightest impact" decisions. The apparent ability
of the courts to perceive a causal link between shock and fright and an
apparently resulting physical injury in the presence of some trivial im-
pact, usually unrelated to either the mental or the emotional trauma,
suggests, of course, that causation is provable without impact.27 The
requirement of some impact, no matter how trivial, is material only to
the supposedly Herculean task of proving causation without impact.
Yet in Stewart the trial court included in its summary judgment the
23. See Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117, 121 (Me. 1970);
Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390, 395-97 (Mich. 1970); Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d
84, 86-87 (Pa. 1970): Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MiCH. L. REv.
497 (1922); Smith, supra note 7; Tbrockmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARv. L. REV.
260 (1921); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent
Tort, 59 GEo. L.J. 1237 (1971). See also H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW
(1959).
24. 271 So. 2d at 472.
25. 261 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1970). In Niederman, Pennsylvania abandoned the impact rule.
Addressing the argument that medical proof of a causal link between fright and physical
injury would be prohibitively difficult, the court acknowledged that medicine had taken
some strides in the eighty-two years since Victorian Railways:
While we agree that this might have been an appropriate conclusion because of the
lack of sophistication in the medical field when the impact doctrine was first an-
nounced in 1888, it would presently be inappropriate for us to ignore all of the
phenomenal advances medical science has achieved in the last eighty years....
New equipment and research, improved education and diagnostic techniques,
and an increased professional understanding of disease in general require us now
to give greater credit to medical evidence.
Id. at 86 (footnote omitted); see Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709, 712 (Del. 1965);
Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117, 121 (Me. 1970); Falzone v. Busch,
.214 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.J. 1965); Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34,
38 (1961).
26. 271 So. 2d at 472-73.
27. The Niederman court observed:
It appears completely inconsistent to argue that the medical profession is ab-
solutely unable to establish a causal connection ...where there is no impact at
all, but that the slightest impact (e.g., a bruised elbow and sprained ankle ...)
suddenly bestows . . . the knowledge and facility to diagnose the causal connection
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finding that Mrs. Stewart "suffered a myocardial infarction as a reaction
to the fright caused by the noise of the collision of Defendant's vehicle
with the house." 28 Similarly, in Way, the jury was apparently con-
vinced, by a preponderance of the evidence, that causation had been
established. But the trial court entered, in effect, a judgment non ob-
stante veredicto by relying upon the impact rule. 9 If it is thus possible
to demonstrate causation without impact, invocation of the rule to
deny recovery seems to denigrate both the substantial attainments of
between emotional states and physical injuries.
261 A.2d at 87 (footnotes omitted); see Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709, 712
(Del. 1965); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117, 121 (Me. 1970);
Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 15 (N.J. 1965); Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1961).
For examples of the application of the slightest impact device, see Arkansas Motor
Coaches, Inc. v. Whitlock, 136 S.W.2d 184 (Ark. 1940) (touching of arm termed a "con-
structive injury"); Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 144 S.E. 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928)
(horse defecated in plaintiff's lap); Interstate Life & Acc. Co. v. Brewer, 193 S.E. 458 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1937) (coins tossed on plaintiff); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 63 A. 860
(N.J. 1906) (dust in eyes); Jones v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 48 N.Y.S. 914 (Sup. Ct. 1897)
(small lightbulb fell on head); Morton v. Stack, 170 N.E. 869 (Ohio 1930) (smoke inhala-
tion); Hess v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 56 A.2d 89 (Pa. 1948) (automobile touched by
electric line); cf. Potere v. City of Philadelphia, 112 A.2d 100 (Pa. 1955).
While Florida could not be fairly characterized as having adopted a "slightest impact"
approach, the supreme court's most recent "impact rule" decision does seem to indicate
a willingness to lessen the rigors of the impact rule when the circumstances in favor of
permitting recovery are compelling. In Clark v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Co-Operative, Inc.,
107 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1958), the plaintiff was ironing clothes in her gasoline service station
building. The building was adjacent to a power line carrying 7,200 volts of electricity,
which the defendant's employees were attempting to repair. The power line fell, struck
the gasoline pumps, and set fire to a nearby woods. When the line fell plaintiff "felt a
shock[,] [h]er tongue thickened, her legs began to ache, then buckled, and she fell to the
ground." Id. at 610. Plaintiff sued for her injuries, which included emotional distress, a
prolonged burning sensation in her limbs, and a curtailment of her actions thereafter.
She suffered no burns or other clearly observable physical injuries. The trial court re-
duced a jury award of $10,000 to $1.00, finding a lack of physical impact. The trial court
apparently found the plaintiff's inability to testify that she knew that she had suffered
an electrical shock (never having experienced one before) as decisive. That is, even the
trial court indicated that it would have recognized an electrical shock, once established,
as "impact."
Thus the supreme court, noting that it was not receding from the impact rule, found
that "impact" clearly occurred when the plaintiff was shocked and simply discounted
the trial court's apparent emphasis upon the absence of burns or bruises and the plain-
tiff's inexperience with electrical shocks.
The decision is not one involving only "slightest impact"; the impact (the shock)
was hardly slight. It does, however, evidence a willingness to broaden the scope of
"impact" to embrace events other than the collision of physical masses.
28. 271 So. 2d at 469.
29. Before the case went to the jury the defendant moved for a directed verdict,
but the trial judge reserved his ruling. After the jury returned a judgment of $1,000 for
the plaintiff, the court ruled for the defendant as a matter of law. 260 So. 2d at 288-89;
see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.480.
Florida State University Law Review
medical science and the ability of juries to evaluate evidence and reach
intelligent conclusions.
Subsumed in this argument about proof of causality is the notion
that the impact rule is needed to establish the foreseeability of mental
distress 0 Without impact, it is argued, one could not reasonably antici-
pate that his actions would produce mental distress, much less resulting
physical trauma, and thus no liability may be found for either injury.
Stewart recognizes that a finding of foreseeability must precede liability,
but correctly perceives that foreseeability is critical in making the ini-
tial determination of negligence. In making that determination the
question is whether the defendant should have foreseen that some in-
jury might result from his actions. If that question is answered in the
affirmative, then liability extends to "all the consequences that reason-
ably and naturally flow . . . from his wrongful act whether or not
these consequences were actually contemplated or foreseen."3 1 Conse-
quently, a requirement of contemporaneous impact adds nothing ana-
lytically useful to the threshold determination of foreseeability. Liabil-
ity must be resolved using one standard for all claims of negligence
regardless of the actual injury incurred.
Responding to the second charge-that fraudulent or exaggerated
claims would be compensated if there were no impact requirement-
the court simply noted that one can accept that proposition only by
conceding that the judicial system is incapable of recognizing fraudu-
lent claims: "[A]ny protection against such . . . claims is contained
within the system itself-in the integrity of our judicial process, the
knowl[edge] of expert witnesses, the concern of juries and the safe-
guards of our evidentiary standards.."
32
More importantly, the impact rule enhances neither the court's nor
the jury's ability to recognize fraudulent claims. This point, too, is
epitomized by the "slightest impact" decisions. In those cases the courts
and the juries have effectively distinguished valid and invalid claims,
but they have implemented their judgments on the validity of the
claims by manipulation of the ill-defined concept of "impact." 33 The
30. See 271 So. 2d at 474; Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920-22, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79-82
(1968). Foreseeability is the chief element of the tort concept of "duty." Thus, many
decisions finding no duty absent impact are largely concerned with foreseeability. See
Green, "Fright" Cases, 27 ILL. L. REV. 761, 763-67 (1933).
31. 271 So. 2d at 474. The opinion recognizes that there is a split of authority as to
whether the defendant's foreseeability must extend to all specific injuries, but notes that
the general rule in Florida supports its position on this issue. See King v. Cooney-Eckstein
Co., 63 So. 659 (Fla. 1913).
32. 271 So. 2d at 475, quoting from Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84, 87 (Pa.
1970).
33. See note 27 supra.
(Vol. I
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danger of fraudulent claims and the difficulty of distinguishing them
from meritorious claims is no different for these cases than for those
in which no impact occurs. The reasoning that prophesies the encour-
agement of fraudulent claims embodies the notion that abandonment
of the impact rule would precipitate recoveries for physical injuries
that could not satisfactorily be linked to the tortious act. The argu-
ment, however, is a part of the broader and periodically deflated no-
tion that medicine has remained in such a sufficiently unsophisticated
state as to be incapable of establishing causation between a tortious
act and the injury for which recovery is sought.
The Stewart court summarily dismissed the third argument-that
the fraudulent claims, supposedly invited by abolition of the impact
rule, would engulf the courts. The short and compelling answer to the
flood-of-frivolous-claims spectre is that experience refutes it.34 Juris-
dictions that have repudiated the rule have experienced no resultant
increase in litigation, and they have not labored under a greater case-
load than have the few states that continue to follow the rule.3 5
If the Florida Supreme Court elects to retain the impact rule when
it hands down its decisions in Stewart and Herlong Aviation, little
more need be said. But assuming, arguendo, that the court will discard
the impact rule, the important question will become what limitations,
if any, it will impose upon recovery for mental distress. Abolition of
the impact rule is not necessarily the equivalent of permitting recovery
for mental distress in all cases. One alternative would simply redirect
analysis from one focusing upon the presence of physical impact to one
focusing upon the presence of physical results of the tortious act. The
impact rule could thus be abandoned while continuing to deny re-
covery for mental distress in the absence of a resulting physical injury.
This alternative has been clearly presented to the court by Stewart and
Herlong Aviation since the two decisions seem to conflict on this point.
Stewart carefully limited its rejection of the rule to situations involv-
ing resulting physical injuries. Herlong Aviation, on the other hand,
allowed recovery for mental distress without resulting physical injury.
Yet this apparent difference in rationales may be illusory-the conse-
quence of carefully fashioning each decision to be exactly as broad as
the facts of the case. Stewart nowhere clearly indicates that a different
34. 271 So. 2d at 475.
35. Id. See Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84, 89 (Pa. 1970), where it is pointed
out that "[t]he volume of litigation has been heaviest in states following the ... impact
rule." The court also refers to the observation of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Okrina
v. Midwestern Corp., 165 N.W.2d 259, 263 (Minn. 1969), that "there is no indication
[that the abandonment of the impact rule] has either spawned a flood of litigation or
bred a rash of fraudulent claims since its adoption in 1892."
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result would be reached were that court presented with the circum-
stances involved in Herlong Aviation."
The rationale supporting a resulting physical injury requirement
is the familiar one that mental distress that is neither produced by nor
results in physical injury is too easily counterfeited and perhaps even
too trivial to compensate.3 7 The arguments underlying this "resulting
physical injury" rule are partly duplicative of those advanced to sup-
port the impact rule. Causation, however, would appear to be a less
important consideration in deciding whether to compensate mental
distress without resulting physical harm than it has been in deciding
whether to compensate the physical effects of mental distress. In the
latter instance emphasis has been traditionally placed upon the diffi-
culty of establishing a causal connection between the mental distress
and the physical injury supposedly resulting from it. In the former,
however, emphasis would most likely be upon the existence and the
severity of the alleged mental distress. In most simple form the argu-
ment would have two parts: resulting physical harm serves to "guaran-
tee" the existence of the alleged emotional distress, and mental distress
that is not severe enough to produce physical harm is de minimis-too
trivial to be compensated by the courts.
Certainly the arguments for and against the fear of fraudulent
claims are applicable here. But preservation of this argument after dis-
carding the impact rule could prove rather tedious since both require-
ments rest, at least in part, upon the same ground. Subsequent deci-
sions would also face the frequently difficult task of distinguishing
physical manifestations of injuries from those that are mental.38 An
36. Although the Stewart court was careful to limit its decision to whether a cause of
action exists for the recovery of damages stemming from the "physical consequences of a
mental or an emotional disturbance caused by a negligent act in [the] absence of physical
impact," 271 So. 2d at 467, nowhere in its opinion did the court speculate on the question
presented in Herlong Aviation. The district courts have been cautious in limiting their
holdings in this area to the facts before them while perhaps holding dormant a more
sweeping viewpoint. Consider, for example, that the same district court of appeal (the
second district) that rendered the carefully limited but path-breaking decision in Way
also decided Herlong Aviation, which apparently totally abandoned the impact rule and
the bar to recovery for mental distress, eight months later.
37. In Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 17 (N.J. 1965), the court framed its holding
thusly:
We hold, therefore, that where negligence causes fright from a reasonable fear of
immediate personal injury, which fright is adequately demonstrated to have re-
sulted in substantial bodily injury or sickness, the injured person may recover if
such bodily injury or sickness would be regarded as proper elements of damage had
they occurred as a consequence of direct physical injury rather than fright. Of
course, where fright does not cause substantial bodily injury or sickness, it is to be




approach demanding a resulting physical injury might evoke a "slight-
est resulting injury" counterpart to the "slightest impact" test. Courts
might again feel obliged to divine appropriate distinctions between
mental disorders and physical "injuries" in order to avoid dismissals
of otherwise clearly meritorious claims.
A second limitation, applied by a number of the courts that have
repudiated the impact rule,39 requires, as a precondition to liability,
that the plaintiff have been within the "zone of danger" created by the
negligent act.40 That is, the plaintiff must have been in a sufficiently
proximate relation to the tortious act for the tort-feasor to have fore-
seen possible injury to him. Absent foreseeability there is no duty
upon which to base a finding of negligence. The flexibility of the
zone-of-danger limitation renders it more desirable than the impact
rule because, under the former analysis, each case is examined on its
facts to determine the parameters of the zone. As previously noted,
foreseeability should be uniform for all injuries, mental or physical,
suffered in the same fact situation since foreseeability relates only to
the initial determination of negligence. Because the zone-of-danger re-
quirement performs this function, no tenable rationale linked to fore-
38. See generally Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an In-
dependent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1258-62 (1971).
39. See, e.g., Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965); Niederman v.
Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1970); Guilmette v. Alexander, 259 A.2d 12 (Vt. 1969). See
also Note, 20 DEPAUL L. REV. 1029, 1040-43 (1971); 16 VILL. L. REV. 1011, 1013
11.12 (1971).
40. See Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 21 A.2d 402 (Conn. 1941); Mahnke v. Moore, 77
A.2d 923 (Md. 1951). The zone-of-danger concept has typically been applied in situations
in which the plaintiff seeks to recover for mental distress or physical injury allegedly
produced by the mental distress occasioned by being placed in fear of personal injtiry
to himself. See Note, One Step Beyond the Zone of Danger Limitation Upon Recovery
for the Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 43 TEMPLE L.Q. 59 (1969). The majority
of decisions have refused to permit recovery for mental distress induced by witnessing
harm done to a third person. See, e.g., Strazza v. McKittrick, 156 A.2d 149 (Conn. 1959);
Resavage v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879 (Md. 1952). California has led the way in
permitting recovery in third party peril cases. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72 (1968). See also Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972);
Jelley v. Laflame, 238 A.2d 728 (N.H. 1968). The view expressed in RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965) would deny recovery for mental distress or resulting physical
harm unless the plaintiff-observer was himself placed in physical danger of impact. See
Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., supra, at 683-84; Guilmette v. Alexander, 259 A.2d 12 (Vt.
1969). But this view is not universally held because it seems illogical to reintroduce an
impact requirement in jurisdictions where the impact rule has been abandoned. Thus,
some courts reject the fear-of-impact requirement but limit recovery to instances in which
recovery is sought for mental distress accompanied by resulting harm. See Dillon v.
Legg, supra; Toms v. McConnell, 207 N.W.2d 140 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); cf. Aragon v.
Speelman, 491 P.2d 173 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971); Schurk v. Christensen, 497 P.2d 937 (Wash.
1972). See generally Note, Traumatic Mental Injury and the Bystander, 24 U. So. Cal. L.
REV. 439 (1972).
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seeability could remain for distinguishing actions for mental distress
from other types of negligence actions; indeed, the propagation of such
a terminological distinction would create a substantive danger in ap-
plication. But a rigid interpretation of the zone-of-danger test could
also give birth to the equivalent of an "almost impact" requirement-
a jurisdiction may choose to set a finite limit upon the parameters of
the zone. Such an analytic scheme would create problems similar to
those experienced under the impact rule.
The painfully obvious alternative, of course, would dispense with
all such artificial limitations upon claims for mental distress. While
"[i]t is universally agreed that there are compelling reasons for limiting
the recovery . . . to claims of serious mental distress, ' ' 41 the limitations
described above are quite probably not the best means of deciding
which claims should be compensated. The simple effect of this ap-
proach would be to bring causes of action for mental distress within
the normal tort principles of duty, breach, proximate cause and
damages. In doing so, courts would not only function within flexible
guidelines in determining causality, but would also employ the objec-
tive standard of the reasonable man in deciding which claims warrant
compensation. Each case would be evaluated on its facts and tested
against the general standards of authenticity and severity of the injury
without being forced to conform to the rigid mold of an artificial lia-
bility-limiting standard. This analysis, it should be remembered, would
only serve to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to present his proof
to the court and to the jury. Thereafter, sufficient protection against
the fears that created and attended the impact rule and the rule deny-
ing compensation for pure mental distress would exist within the ap-
plication of normal tort principles and within the expertise and abili-
ties of physicians, lawyers, judges and juries.42
41. Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Hawaii 1970).
42. On January 10, 1974, the supreme court reversed the decisions of the district
courts of appeal in Stewart and Herlong Aviation. The majority concluded that these
cases failed to raise any valid justification for rejecting long standing precedent in
Florida and did not undertake any substantive analysis of the impact rule. In reaching
its decision the court emphasized the failure of the district courts to recognize the binding
effect of its prior decisions. The court did note that it continues to except intentionally
inflicted torts from the strictures of the impact rule.
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